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e S-400 deal signed between Turkey and Russia has sparked an intense debate in the 
international arena, where harsh criticisms have been leveled against Turkey, extending from 
whether Turkey needs to spend billions of dollars to buy an air defense system whose 
effectiveness has not yet been entirely proven across a spectrum of air-borne threats, to how 
Turkey's longstanding alliance relationship with the US and its status in NATO as a prominent 
Ally might be severely damaged due to the country's increasing degree of rapprochement with 
Russia. 
Hence, this paper will,  rst of all, explain the reasons behind Turkey's desire to build an 
elaborate air defense structure, and discuss how and why its successive attempts to reach this 
objective in collaboration with the allied countries have failed. Second, the paper will highlight 
the major arguments behind the severe criticisms in the West concerning Turkey's negotiations, 
 rst with a Chinese  rm, and then with a Russian  rm, and how this entire process has become 
a serious bone of contention between Turkey and the US, carrying a risk of a spill over into 
NATO. ird, the paper will discuss why and how the severe sanctions threatened to be 
imposed on Turkish defense industries by the Trump administration will indeed damage the 
security and the defensive capability not only of Turkey, but also the United States. Fourth, the 
paper will elaborate on how the intense debate on the S-400 deal with Russia has become a 
politically motivating factor for young Turks to join the defense industries sector, and for the 
government to further support and sponsor domestic research and development projects in this 
 eld. Finally, the paper will conclude with remarks and recommendations with a view to 
 nding a breakthrough in the strained relations between Turkey and US stemming from its 
decision to buy the Russian S-400 air defense system. 
Executive Summary
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I. Introduction
The Four Faces of the S-400 Deal Between 
Turkey and Russia
e S-400 deal signed between Turkey and Russia concerning the sale of 4 battalions of 
sophisticated Russian air defense systems, worth 2.5 billion U.S. dollars, sparked yet another 
round of stiff debate in the international arena, where harsh criticisms have been leveled against 
Turkey mainly from the ranks of its NATO allies. 
A number of issues have been raised in these criticisms, extending from whether Turkey needs 
to spend billions of dollars on buying an air defense system whose effectiveness has not yet been 
entirely proven across a spectrum of air-borne threats, to how Turkey's longstanding alliance 
relationship with the US and its status in NATO as a prominent Ally might be severely 
damaged due to the country's increasing degree of rapprochement with Russia, whose foreign 
and security policies toward the West constitute major challenges for the Alliance¹ and to the 
rules-based system that has been put in place since the end of the Cold War.
Hence, this paper will,  rst of all, discuss the fundamental issues that have come to the fore, 
prior to and during the debate, by focusing particularly on the four faces of the controversial S-
400 deal that was signed and sealed between Turkey and Russia in December 2017. In this 
context, the paper will  rst highlight the reasons behind Turkish authorities' desire to build an 
elaborate air defense structure in the post-Cold War era, and then discuss how and why their 
successive attempts to reach this objective in collaboration with the allied countries have failed.
Second, the major arguments behind the harsh criticisms leveled against Turkey's negotiations 
for purchasing an air defense system,  rst from a Chinese  rm, and then a Russian  rm, and 
how this entire process has become a serious bone of contention between Turkey and its NATO 
allies, in particular the US will be discussed.
ird, the impact of Turkey's acquisition of S-400 from Russia on its medium to long-term 
objectives to build an effective air defense architecture will be discussed under the shadow of the 
threatening statements pronounced by leading civil and military  gures in the Trump 
administration, hinting at severe military and economic sanctions to be imposed on Turkey.
Fourth, the positive spin of the intense debate on the S-400 deal that has apparently become a 
politically motivating factor for Turks, particularly those from the younger generation, toward 
joining the defense industries sector will be elaborated. 
Finally, the paper will conclude with remarks and recommendations with a view to  nding a 
breakthrough in the strained relations between Turkey and its allies that resulted from its 
decision to buy the Russian S-400 air defense system.
Finally, the paper will conclude with remarks and recommendations with a view to  nding a 
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breakthrough in the strained relations between Turkey and its allies that resulted from its 
decision to buy the Russian S-400 air defense system.
On Turkey's Missile Defense Strategy: The Four Faces of the S-400 
Deal Between Turkey and Russia
Due to its geographical location in the vicinity of the most volatile regions of the world, the 
deployment of an advanced air defense system against the threat posed by the missile and 
aircraft capabilities in the arsenals of a number of surrounding countries has become an urgent 
necessity for Turkey. 
e existing air defense systems in the country, such as the Stingers, Rapiers and the Hawks, not 
only have limited ranges (i.e., short and medium), but also limited lifespans. ey are aging 
fast. Turkey's Nike Hercules missiles, which were deployed around the city of Istanbul during 
the Cold War years, have relatively longer ranges of about 140 km, but they cannot be relied 
upon any more, and many have been sent to retirement already. 
 Hence, it wouldn't be wrong to argue that Turkey's airspace is not being protected by proper 
2land-based air defense systems, nor is the vast territory of 783,562 km  beneath it, where 82 
million Turks live in their homeland.  
In lieu of an effective land-based system, Turkey's airspace is patrolled by Turkish Air Force 
units consisting of F-16  ghter aircraft, which carry air-to-air missiles, as well as early warning 
(i.e., AWACS) and refueling (Aerial Tanker) aircraft, with a view to achieving active protection 
against potential missile attacks and violations of Turkish airspace by enemy aircraft. is is by 
no means an acceptable situation from Turkey's standpoint for two reasons: First, the cutting 
edge technologies used in the land-based anti-ballistic missile defense systems are far more 
capable of engaging enemy missiles and aircraft while they are still hundreds of kilometers away 
from the homeland, and they are also much more reliable in eliminating them before they get 
dangerously close to the strategic assets in the country. Second, military aircraft in the 
inventory of the Turkish Air Force, such as F16s, which have to  y much longer hours due to 
airspace patrolling and protection missions than they would normally do during periods of 
stable relations with neighbors, run the risk of aging more rapidly as a result of metal fatigue. 
e excessive stress load on the pilots is also a factor, although a certain proportion of these 
patrolling missions are being carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which have 
entered the Turkish Air Force inventory recently.³ Although the use of drones may reduce the 
strain on personnel, UAVs are far less effective than a land-based system would be. Turkey is 
therefore in dire need of deploying a proper air defense structure that would provide consistent 
coverage all over the country in order to meet the fundamental requirements of being a 
sovereign state, as well as protecting its population and its territorial integrity in a rather hostile 
environment.  
is issue has long been on the agenda of Turkish politicians, diplomats, and military personnel 
who have conducted a series of negotiations with their American counterparts since the 
temporary deployment of the U.S. “Patriot” air defense system in Turkey's southeast during the 
II. Turkey's Strategic Environment and its Quest 
for Air Defense Capability
4
 rst Iraq war in 1991.  Since then, Turkish authorities have been more than willing to deploy 
these elaborate air defense systems permanently in Turkey, especially in regions neighboring the 
Middle East. Despite the extended negotiations, however, no consensus could be found in 
order to go ahead with a joint project. Turkey's desire back in the late 1990s was to have a share 
in the development of the ballistic missile defense technology, a proposal that was not warmly 
welcomed by the United States.  
A similar situation occurred in the triangular relations among Turkey, the United States and 
Israel with respect to cooperation on the development and deployment of the “Arrow-II” air 
defense system, which has never been realized. While the Americans put the blame on the 
Israelis as being the ones who did not want to share this new and sensitive technology with 
Turkey, Israelis pronounced almost exactly the same views regarding the attitude of their 
American counterparts.  All in all, the project was shelved from the perspective of Turkey.
Turkey's quest to develop an elaborate air defense capacity nevertheless continued during the 
second half of the 2000s, as Ankara widened the scope of potential suppliers to include new 
countries, such as China, Russia, and NATO allies France and Italy. Turkey issued a call in 2009 
for the procurement of a “Long-range Air and Missile Defense System,” dubbed T-
LORAMIDS, and collected offers in 2010.  e U.S.  rms Raytheon and Lockheed Martin 
responded to the call with Patriots, while the Chinese  rm CPMIEC made its offer with FD-
2000 (the export version of HQ-9), and the Russian  rm Rosoboroneksport offered S-400. 
Later, the Franco-Italian consortium Eurosam offered SAMP/T.
While the bid was still in the evaluation phase on the side of the Turkish authorities, the year 
2010 was also critical in terms of developments in NATO air defense. During the Lisbon 
summit of the Alliance in November of that year, it was announced that the Ballistic Missile 
Defense (BMD) project that the United States had been developing for a couple of decades 
already, would be transformed into a NATO-wide air defense structure, also known as the 
“Missile Shield.” Hence, the debate on Turkey's quest for deploying an elaborate air defense 
capability took a new turn, with comments and criticisms coming from experts and analysts 
underlining whether it would be a wise decision for Turkey to spend billions of dollars while 
there would be a NATO project underway that would soon take care of defending the allies 
against a spectrum of air-borne threats originating from enemy territories.
 Two issues that were either overlooked or hardly mentioned during that debate were highly 
critical from Turkey's perspective. First, if everything went according to plan, it would take 
about a decade for the “Missile Shield” project to become fully operational, if not longer, 
meaning that Turkey's airspace would remain unprotected by land-based air defense systems 
during that period. Second, no one mentioned publicly that even when the “Missile Shield” 
would become fully operational in the 2020s, large parts of Turkey's eastern and southeastern 
districts could not be covered and, therefore, would not be protected due to the technical and 
geographical limitations of the project.  
Authorities argued that the gap could be  lled, theoretically, and if need be, with a temporary 
deployment of U.S. Aegis ashore systems in the eastern Mediterranean. is, however, would 
not be considered a highly convincing argument for a variety of reasons, such as the slow 
deployment of the Patriots in Turkey's southeast in 2012 against the threat posed by Syria and 
their hasty withdrawal a couple of years later. 
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III. Turkey's Air Defense Project becomes a Bone 
of Contention with Allies
e lack of an effective air defense system in Turkey was felt vividly when Syria plunged into 
civil war in March 2011, which eventually led, among other things, to a reversal of the then 
gradually improving bilateral relations between Ankara and Damascus.  In response to Syria's 
shooting down of a Turkish military reconnaissance aircraft in the international airspace of the 
eastern Mediterranean in June 2012, the issue was brought before the NATO Council. e 
Council discussed and eventually approved, in December 2012, the deployment of Patriot 
battalions in Turkey's southeastern cities along the Syrian border, namely Adana, 
Kahramanmaraş and Gaziantep, as a protective measure against possible attacks coming from 
Syria again.  
is incident revived the need for taking swift measures for deploying a permanent air defense 
structure in the country vis-à-vis the growing threat perceived from the ballistic and cruise 
missile capabilities in the arsenals of its neighboring states. Based on the lessons learned from 
earlier attempts in the 1990s and 2000s, the prevailing view among Turkish authorities was, 
this time, to acquire an elaborate air defense capability in such a way that:
• e system would provide an effective air defense shelter for Turkey against the 
threat of ballistic and cruise missiles as well as military aircraft;
• e  rst set of batteries could be deployed and become operational within a short 
span of time after the signing of the purchase agreement;
• e supplier  rm would agree to share the technology with Turkey to allow co-
production of the system, including its advanced versions in the near future; and
• e price should be affordable.
e Chinese  rm CPMIEC, which had offered the FD-2000 (the export version of HQ-9) air 
defense system, came to the fore with a promise for an early delivery of the batteries as well as a 
price that was considerably lower than the price of the S-400, the Patriot, and the SAMP/T. Yet 
most of Turkey's allies in the West, the United States in particular, were quick to react harshly to 
Ankara's pick among the bidders, on the grounds that the Chinese system would not be 
compatible with the “Missile Shield” that was being erected across Alliance territory, with a 
major contribution from Turkey with the radar site in the Kürecik village near the city of 
Malatya in the southeastern part of the country. Critics of Turkey's decision to go ahead with 
the Chinese  rm, from both inside and outside of the country, also argued that the FD-2000 air 
defense system, if deployed, would seriously jeopardize the integrity of NATO's sensitive 
command, control, and communication systems as well as its intelligence collecting capability. 
It was also emphasized in these criticisms that the Chinese  rm CPMIEC was subject to 
sanctions of the United States. 
Turkish political and military authorities tried hard to convince their peers in Western capitals 
and military headquarters that it would be technically possible to  nd effective solutions for 
preventing such scenarios from occurring. Nevertheless, the political climate was not at all 
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conducive for reaching a consensus between the parties. As one high-ranking NATO official 
once told the author at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, “even though effective measures 
could be put in place, technically speaking, in order to prevent leakage of sensitive information 
to the Chinese  rm, it would be simply not acceptable for the Alliance, politically speaking, to 
agree to a Turkish-Chinese deal.” 
While the Chinese deal was still on the negotiation table, the ever-increasing pressure exerted 
on Turkey by its allies apparently caused a certain degree of reluctance in Ankara's attitude to 
 nalize the deal, which in turn, caused the Chinese  rm to withdraw its offer. is development 
led to a new round of talks between Turkey and the other contenders to renew their offers, 
bearing in mind what may have made them fail in the previous round.  
is time, the Russian  rm Rosoboroneksport stood out with its S-400 “Triumf” missile 
system. Turkish and Russian authorities conducted negotiations during 2016 and 2017, which 
culminated in the signing of an agreement.   
Criticisms voiced by politicians, diplomats, and civil and military experts from the allied 
countries as well as from within the country, with respect to Turkey's choice of the Russian  rm, 
were no less severe than those pronounced only two years before when the Chinese offer was on 
the negotiation table. is time, however, some of the allies, the United States being at the 
forefront, went beyond the limits of diplomatic niceties by issuing threatening statements, 
implying that they would impose severe military and economic sanctions should Turkey 
 nalize the procurement of the Russian air defense system. 
e S-400 deal raised a number concerns ranging from the technical aspects of military 
cooperation within NATO to broader political considerations. Some have argued that the S-
400 issue increased the possibility that Russia could take advantage of U.S.-Turkey friction to 
undermine the NATO alliance.  
During a press brie ng in May 2018, a State Department spokesperson said, “Under NATO 
and under the NATO agreement... you're only supposed to buy... weapons and other materiel 
that are interoperable with other NATO partners. We don't see [an S-400 system from Russia] 
as being interoperable.”  In March 2018, Czech General Petr Pavel, who chairs the NATO 
Military Committee, voiced concerns about the possibility that Russian personnel helping 
operate a S-400 system in Turkey could gain signi cant intelligence on NATO assets stationed 
in the country. 
NATO Secretary General has consistently underlined that “decisions on acquisition of military 
capabilities is a national decision, but what is important for NATO is interoperability, that the 
different systems can work together.” 
Assistant Secretary of State Wess Mitchell, who spoke at a foreign relations subcommittee 
hearing at the U.S. Senate on June 26, 2018, explained that the United States would implement 
sanctions against Turkey through “Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries 
rough Sanctions Act.” Mitchell also said that Ankara's decision to purchase the Russian 
missiles would lead Washington to cancel further delivery of F-35 stealth  ghters.  
More recently, the “Unclassi ed Executive Summary” of the “FY19 NDAA Sec 1282 Report” 
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Republic of Turkey,” in its section on the “Impact of Turkey's S-400 Acquisition,” states that 
“the U.S. Government has made clear to the Turkish Government that purchasing the S-400 
would have unavoidable negative consequences for U.S.-Turkey bilateral relations, as well as 
Turkey's role in NATO, including:
• Potential sanctions under Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries 
rough Sanctions Act (CAATSA);
• Risk to Turkish participation in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program (both 
aircraft acquisition and industrial workshare);
• Risk to other potential future U.S. arms transfers to Turkey, and risk of losing 
broader bilateral defense industrial cooperation; 
• Reduction in NATO interoperability; and
• Introduction of new vulnerabilities from Turkey's increased dependence on Russia, 
including sanctioned Russian defense entities, for sophisticated military 
equipment.”
e Report also states that “Turkish acquisition programs that could be affected include but are 
not limited to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Patriot Air and Missile Defense System, CH-47F 
Chinook heavy lift helicopter, UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter, and the F-16 Fighting 
Falcon aircraft,” and that the U.S. administration would reassess Turkey's continued 
participation as one of eight partner nations should they continue with their purchase of the S-
400. 
e severity of these sanctions goes without saying; if imposed on Turkey, they may cause 
serious damage to Turkey' defensive capacity and operational capabilities, at least in the short to 
medium term. ese risks raise the most important question of all: Who will bene t from such 
a situation, and who will lose, if and when these sanctions are put in practice? e answer is in 
IV. Impact of Turkey's Acquisition of S-400 on
its Defensive Capacity
e bulk of criticisms in the West against Turkey's S-400 deal with Russia originates mainly 
from the deal's political implications due to the increasing degree of rapprochement between 
Turkey, a NATO ally, and Russia, NATO's long-standing archrival in particular in the 
aftermath of its illegal annexation of Crimea which has been perceived, from the allies' 
perspective, a signi cant challenge to the Euro-Atlantic security and defense architecture. 
Critics at home instead question the military implications of the deal, basically on two grounds, 
one of which is whether the Russian deal would solve Turkey's need for deploying an elaborate 
air defense system, and the other is whether the whole controversy is worth the risk of being 
alienated within the NATO alliance, and being exposed to the severe military and economic 
sanctions of the United States.  
As for the  rst concern, it would be far-fetched to argue that the purchase of a Russian air 
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defense system, consisting of only four S-400 battalions, no matter how sophisticated they may 
be, would provide effective deterrence or extensive protection for Turkey against enemy missiles 
and military aircraft in an actual con ict. Due to the limited number of battalions and the 
extent of the area each one of them would cover, the system could only operate on “stand alone” 
mode, and therefore, only the strategic locations of major cities, selected military installations, 
and critical infrastructure and industrial sites would be protected.   Given this possible 
scenario, once the S-400 system is deployed and became operational, which could be as soon as 
late 2019 or early 2020, then the second concern, which questions whether the whole 
controversy is worth the risk of facing severe sanctions by the allies, gains currency. 
As of February 2019, it is not certain whether the United States will de nitely impose the 
above-cited sanctions as a response to Turkey's purchase of the Russian S-400 system. But one 
must bear in mind that the sanctions mentioned here would damage not only Turkey's 
interests, but also those of the United States by way of crippling the defensive capacity and the 
operational capability of the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole, where Turkey is a major power 
neighboring one of the most volatile regions of the world. 
erefore, attempting to weaken Turkish military capacity and its economy would only play 
into the hands of the rivals and the enemies of Turkey, in particular, and of NATO, in general, 
thereby resulting in a lose-lose situation for both parties within the Alliance. 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan told journalists, on return from a summit meeting with 
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, which was held in 
Sochi, Russia on February 15, 2019 that the purchase of S-400 was a “done deal.”  Having 
heard this from Turkey's top political leader, and also knowing that nearly half of the price of 
the S-400 battalions has already been paid to the Russians, a reversal in the Turkish 
government's policy from this point onward would be only remotely possible, if not totally 
impossible. No sovereign state would logically take such a radical decision. 
If political and military authorities in the United States have come to the point of discussing the 
imposition of severe sanctions on Turkey because of the S-400 deal, they should, before 
everything else, ask themselves how Turkey has come, or rather, has been pushed, to the point of 
negotiating such a deal with Russia. 
Had the United States administrations so far agreed to the sale of the Patriot air defense system 
to Turkey under terms similar to those which some of their other allies have entertained, such 
as, for instance, the Netherlands and Spain, would Turkish authorities have looked for other 
suppliers from China or Russia? Most probably not! So, who is to blame for the current 
deadlock that Turkey and its allies have been experiencing lately because of the S-400 deal with 
Russia?
V. Impact of the Debate on Turkey's Quest for 
Air Defense on the Public
Turkey's missile defense procurement process has frequently made headlines in media outlets 
both at home and abroad over the last decade, which has indeed done a great deal of service for 
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First and foremost, the intense debate has attracted the attention of young pupils from all over 
the country, sparking a keen interest in defense-related matters. Turkish citizens have also 
appreciated the value of becoming self-sufficient in this area by investing more in the defense 
industries sector.  
Recently, a growing number of Turkish university students have in mind the goal of joining one 
of the companies operating in Turkey's defense industries sector, such as Roketsan,  Aselsan, 
and Havelsan.   ese young Turks constitute the hidden treasure of the country as well as the 
great potential for the rapid progress of the Turkish economy in the coming decades.
Second, Turkish governments have become much more conscious than ever about the 
signi cance of supporting and thus sponsoring domestic research and development projects in 
the  eld of defense industries. As an indicator of this acknowledgment, one might cite that the 
capacity of the Presidency of Defense Industries operating under the auspices of the Presidency 
of the Republic of Turkey   has increased many folds, in less than a decade, in terms of skilled 
human resources,  nancial assets, and technical capabilities.
At a ceremony at the Turkish Scienti c and Technological Research Council's (TÜBİTAK) 
Defense Industry Research and Development Institute (SAGE) campus in Ankara in October 
2018, President Erdoğan stated that “Turkey is moving rapidly on the way to have a say in all 
 elds of defense, aviation and space technologies.” He noted “the locality rate in the defense 
industry [has] increased from 20 percent to 65 percent.” President Erdoğan also emphasized 
that “Turkey will reach the target of an independent and strong country by uninterruptedly 
continuing its national defense moves that have been initiated in the defense industry.”
ese two extremely valuable developments alone, which have been taking place in the country 
almost simultaneously over the past several years, thanks to the reluctance of Turkey's allies to 
supply sophisticated weapons systems, indeed re ect the extent of change in the mindset of 
Turkish people from all ranks of society as well as the degree of transformation and 
determination of the government to become self-reliant in defense procurement matters. 
It is hoped that Turkey's friends and allies will take note of this rapid change and the 
transformation in the country in a timely manner in order to be able draw up win-win scenarios 
in the alliance relationship that otherwise seem to be tilted toward lose-lose, due to careless 
speeches in Western capitals and military headquarters about imposing severe sanctions on 
their “staunch ally” Turkey.
VI. Conclusion and Recommendations
e world is a dangerous place and, unfortunately, it's not likely to get any better in the 
foreseeable future for countries like Turkey that seek stability and peace in their neighborhoods. 
Hence, achieving collaboration and cooperation among like-minded states is more important 
than ever, in the face of threats posed by rival states and non-state actors.
Bearing these in mind, the United States and other concerned NATO countries should 
thoroughly revise their stance vis-à-vis Turkey's desire to build its own elaborate air defense 
architecture, preferably in close collaboration with them. Such an eventuality would certainly 
serve the national interest of both Turkey and the NATO allies. 
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Hence, the U.S. Raytheon-Lockheed Martin consortium and the Franco-Italian Eurosam 
consortium should both revise and refresh their offers to provide Turkey with an elaborate air 
defense capability that could be integrated to the Alliance-wide Missile Shield project once it 
becomes fully operational and then onwards.
Should this be the case, the co-existence of two separate air defense systems deployed on 
Turkish territory, one of them being the Russian S-400s that would be operational on “stand 
alone” mode, would not cause security problems for the NATO allies. 
Politicians, diplomats, and civil and military experts from the allied countries who have harshly 
criticized Turkey for purchasing strategic weapons systems from Russia should feel the 
responsibility to prove that their governments were sincere in their statements suggesting that 
they would like to be the major supplier of the air defense system that used to be on the mind of 
Turkish authorities. ey should also ask their government officials to act accordingly and 
swiftly catch up with the time that they unfortunately wasted so far.
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